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THE ROLE OF LAW IN REGULATING DISCRIMINATION
IN PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION*
THoms

P.

LEwis**

I Npublic
A discussion of the role of law in regulating discrimination in places of
accommodation, early definition of "public accommodations" is important but not uncomplicated. To say that the phrase describes establishments
offering goods, services, or accommodations to the general public surely uncovers
the central area of concern, but it may mislead because the law may have a
proper role in determining the kinds of establishments which do not, but should,
offer their product to the general public. This problem is further complicated
by the fact that an establishment's past practices may be relevant in determining
the role the law should play in regulating the establishment. For example, proof
that an organization functions as a private club may be crucial in determining
that it can or should be allowed to continue its restricted operation. But other
factors, for example the location of the "private club" in a state park, may
lead to the determination that the club should or must become a public accommodation as defined above. The troublesome concept of state action pervades
the subject of the federal law's role in dealing with discrimination in places of
public accommodations. It is partly because of the fluidity of this concept that
there will be interaction between definition of public accommodations and the
tracing out of the law's role. Because the equal protection clause has to some
extent predetermined the role of the law in regulating racial discrimination, it
is necessary to distinguish between public accommodations privately owned and
operated without extraordinary governmental support, and those governmentally
owned or supported. This distinction has relevance for the Supreme Court as it
determines its role in applying the fourteenth amendment. It is also important
to other agencies of government because different intensities of conflicting interests are reflected by the two types of accommodations. It will be convenient to
divide the discussion below into two parts which recognize this distinction.
Another important interaction is between means and ends. In our country
we cannot speak of "the law" without thinking about its source. Assertions about
the role of the law may concern federal law or state law, and within either of
these major heads, an author may further qualify his remarks by limiting them
to law with its primary source or impetus in the judicial, legislative or executive
branches of government. The state action concept again may have an important
bearing in determining the qualifications which should surround an assertion
about the law's role. There will be wider areas of agreement about the role
which state law ought to play than on the role which federal law should play.
* This paper, along with the Comments appearing at pages 439 and 443, was presented
at a conference on discrimination and the law at the University of Chicago Law School
on November 22-23, 1963. The conference was jointly sponsored by the Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith and the University of Chicago Law School.
** Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Washington. A.B. 1959, LL.B. 1954, University of Kentucky.
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There probably are wider areas of agreement about the role which should be
filled by legislative enactment at the federal level than there are concerning the
role to be played by Supreme Court decree. For this reason, I believe it is
necessary to discuss the role of law in terms of the roles which can be justified
for the various branches and organs of government. Because the Supreme Court
has had the most active part in developing the content of the state action concept, and because many precedents exist which provide an existing backdrop
against which to discuss the role of the law, the first section of each of the two
major parts of this paper will consider the role of the Supreme Court.
PART I
PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION OWNED, OPERATED OR SUPPORTED BY
GOVERNMENT'

A. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court, shortly after the decision of the school segregation
cases, extended the rule of those cases to other facilities owned and operated
by state governments which are open to the public. 2 This result is generally
accepted, even by many who are broadly opposed to anti-discrimination laws.3
The problematic situations have involved the use of government property by
lessees and the support of government for certain establishments otherwise
private. It is too clearly established now to warrant debate that the state may
not be the author of racial discrimination. Of course, when the state operates
a facility open to most of the public, a policy to exclude Negroes or other
minorities can be formulated only by government officials. The necessity of
deciding who will be served is faced by government and the duty to decide in
favor of service to all on an equal basis can be found in the fourteenth amendment, though a strict interpretation is given to its words limiting its application
to the state. If this is taken as established, what results should follow in the
leasing cases? Suppose the state leases a public park to a "private operator"
who will continue to use the land as a park. Governmental officials again must
decide who shall be admitted to the park, unless the power to decide is delegated
to the lessee. Should they be allowed to escape responsibility for the decision
made by the lessee? It is state property, provided for use by the public. It is
suggested that when a facility exists by virtue of governmental effort to serve
a public need or want it should be available to all on an equal basis. To hold
otherwise would be to rob the principle that government cannot be the-author
1. Some of the ideas and language of this Part are taken from an earlier article, Lewis,
The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1083 (1960).
2. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam); Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350
U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam).
3. In a pamphlet prepared by the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government,
Civil Rights and Legal Wrongs (1963), challenging the validity of the President's pending
Civil Rights Bill, the authors accept a requirement of equal service by public (state) institutions and public service corporations. Id. at 8, 11.
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of racial discrimination of its meaning. In Derrington v. Plummer,4 one of the
leading cases treating the question, the private lessee of a cafeteria installed
by a county in its courthouse had refused to serve Negroes. The lease was found
to be an arms-length transaction entered into for an adequate consideration.
In a suit by Negroes the county was enjoined from leasing the cafeteria without
taking measures to prevent discrimination. The court was moved to this decision
because the nature of the property was such that its purpose was obviously to
serve those who might be in the court house. There is dictum in the case indicating that a lessee of county property not needed for county purposes would not
be subject to the fourteenth amendment provided the lessor county did not join
in the enterprise conducted or show a purpose to discriminate. Some earlier
cases had treated lessees of public property as private individuals upon finding
the lease an arms-length transaction, not prompted by an attempt to evade
governmental duties of equal treatment. 5 It now seems to be clearly established
that the motives of the state and the fairness of the consideration given for the
lease are irrelevant when the state's purpose is that the property be used to
serve the public.
This purpose is usually evident from the nature of the property itself.
Municipal golf courses, swimming pools, state parks, courthouse cafeterias, airport restaurants and motels are owned or created by the state clearly for the
benefit of the public. Sometimes, however, property leased is non-descript and
is capable of being used for several purposes. The state may simply wish to
salvage its value by leasing it for whatever purpose a suitable tenant desires.
According to the dictum in the Derrington case the lessee in these circumstances
would be treated as a private individual. Some doubt as to the validity of this
distinction, assuming for the moment that the state action concept does stand
between the federal government and an ordinary private proprietor as far as
the force of the fourteenth amendment is concerned, has been cast by the
Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.6
In that case the Court required the lessee of a restaurant located in a
building erected by the Authority to serve Negroes as well as whites. Had there
been evidence showing the public agency had a purpose to provide a restaurant
facility the result could have been justified on that ground. The evidence reflected
that the Authority, in order to finance the erection of a parking facility, had
built into the building additional spaces suitable for commercial lease. One of
these spaces had been leased to the restaurateur in question, who had made
the highest bid. The space was outfitted as a restaurant at considerable expense
to the lessee, and presumably he could have equipped the space to serve any
legitimate function he chose. Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, said
4. 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956) cert. denied, sub nom. Casey v. Plummer, 353 U.S. 924
(1957). See also Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (per curiam).
5. See Easterly v. Dempster, 112 F. Supp. 214 (ED. Tenn. 1953); Harris v. City of
St. Louis, 223 Mo. App. 911, 111 S.W.2d 995 (1938).
6. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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that the problem of distinguishing private action from state action under the
fourteenth amendment should be solved by determining whether, "to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been found to have
become involved in ... [private conduct] ."7 He then listed the following facts
pointing to the "significant" involvement of the state in the restaurant enterprise: the public ownership of the land and building; the purchase and maintenance of the land and building with funds obtained from donations by the city,
loans, and the sale of revenue bonds; the responsibility of the parking authority
under the lease for the upkeep and maintenance of the building, including the
portion used as a restaurant; the benefits flowing from the parking facility to
the restaurant guests (convenient parking) and from the restaurant to the parking facility (additional demands for parking space created by restaurant guests).
In addition to these facts, Mr. Justice Clark noted that the relationship of, the
restaurant to the parking facility would result in tax exemption for any improvements Eagle might make that become a part of the realty and finally that the
profits earned by discriminatory practices were indispensable to the success of
a governmental agency.
Since the direction which the Court will take in applying the state action
conception cannot yet be clearly discerned, it is difficult to know precisely what
the significance of these facts is. The case may simply reach the outer limits of
the idea derived from the Derringtoncase. It may stand for nothing more than
a decision reached on all the facts of the case, which were exhaustively detailed
by the Court. It may be the first step in the creation of a principle looking
towards state responsibility for equal treatment in the use of all state-owned
property opened by a lessee to large segments of the publics at least where the
property is easily identifiable as state property. Arguments will be developed
later in this paper that government officials should attach conditions insuring
equal treatment of all races to all leases of public property to be used as a
business which caters to the public. The present question is the Court's role in
directing the insertion of such conditions and this role becomes embroiled in
the controversy surrounding state action. Suppose for example, that the Authority had leased a space to a club such as the Elks, or to a church or labor union.
Since the purpose of leasing was to create income for the Authority, it is difficult
to characterize the various relationships between the lessee and lessor as resulting in state financial or other support. Unless the fourteenth amendment is to
apply generally to lessees of state property, some rational basis should exist for
drawing lines. This is the problem the Derrington court was trying to face.
Perhaps events and the seriousness of the problem of racial discrimination justify a constitutional rule that government cannot create the impression of discrimination in a governmental facility. The restaurant was a business catering
to the public and it was a physically integral part of a building which in its
totality appeared to be a governmental facility.
7. Id. at 722.
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The difference between Burton and Derrington may yet have important
consequences. It was suggested that the Court probably would not rule out a
lease from the Authority to a bona-fide club. If this is correct, whether an establishment will be forced to serve all persons on an equal basis in the Burton
context depends upon its existing practices. If it never offered services to the
general public, it may not be required to change its practices. If its practice
has been to cater to the general public except Negroes, it will be required to
serve Negroes also. How far can this distinction be followed? Suppose a state
or city leases land or buildings in a park developed for general recreation. Some
leaseholds are developed as motels, restaurants and general tourist accommodations while others are developed as private boating clubs and golf courses.
If the circumstances warrant the conclusion that a recreational facility remains
the goal of the state (if it does, it will be difficult for the state to disguise it)
Derrington, and a fortiori, Burton, indicate the public accommodations must
not discriminate in offering service to the public. But is it not also true that
the "private" nature of the clubs is impermissible, at least to the extent it is
used to justify arbitrary exclusion of prospective members? The public purpose
of recreation is present. It is being served by a facility, the park, publicly
owned. Leasing cannot be justified purely as a financial venture-the transformation of un-needed property into usable cash. Rather, leasing the land is
but a means of serving the public's wants and needs in terms of facilities. Part
of this public domain should not be diverted to uses which exclude the participation of persons for reasons foreclosed to the state because of their arbitrary
nature.8 In short the duty of state officials to exercise the opportunity they
have to attach conditions to the leases is provided by the command to the state
contained in the equal protection clause. 9
Another problem which has been brought to the courts is whether private
establishments may retain the privileges of private status after they have re8. Recent action by the Chicago Park District is interesting in this connection. Upon
learning that a private yacht club holding a lease on land within a park area refused membership to persons because of race or color, the District terminated the lease, stating that the
club's action violated federal and state laws governing the park as well as ordinances and
resolutions of the Chicago Park District. 7 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1279 (1962).
9. Hampton v. -City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied sub
nor. Ghioto v. Hampton, 371 U.S. 911 (1962), and Anderson v. Moses, 185 F. Supp. 727
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) should be compared with Burton and Derrington. In Hampton, the Court
of Appeals held that the sale of a municipal golf course by the city to private individuals
did not remove the golf course from the purview of the equal protection clause since the
city had assured continued operation of the property as a golf course by means of a possibility of reverter clause. Cf. Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 276 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1960)
(per curiam). In Anderson, it was ruled that a restaurant in New York's Central Park,
operated by a licensee of the city, is subject to the fourteenth amendment for purposes of
determining its obligation to rent facilities to a group expressing views unpopular with the
public. The restaurant had allowed its facilities to be used by other groups including some
political in nature, and it was clear from the circumstances that the city's purpose in owning
the restaurant was to provide a public facility. It is doubtful that the Eagle Coffee Shoppe
in the Burton case would be subjected to the amendment in this way. All this indicates the
possibility that the equal protection clause and discrimination by enterprises presently open
to everyone but certain minority groups bring special considerations into play. Some factors
unique to the public accommodations problem will be discussed in Part II.
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ceived governmental assistance in some form. For purposes of discussion, it is
assumed that the state's general common law and statutory structure under
which its people carry on their private affairs, own property and contract, each
enjoying equality in terms of legal capacities, is not such state assistance as
would transform private conduct into state action for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment. The question has been raised in relation to various forms of "extraordinary" assistance such as direct financial grants, use of government property,
exercise of the power of eminent domain, tax exemption, and guaranteed private loans. Owing to the lack of authoritative judicial consideration of the constitutional problem posed by "extraordinary" state assistance, any analysis of
the problem must be largely speculative, but the present scope and variety of
such state assistance indicate that the eventual solution may have far-reaching
effects.
When the recipient of state welfare payments, subsidies, or educational
benefits is considered, it is apparent that financial aid does not of itself characterize the recipient as an agent of the state for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment. It has been suggested that financial aid as such is irrelevant'0
and that it cannot change the character of an agency from private to governmental.:" Financial aid, however, can never be isolated completely from the
context in which it is given. If the purpose of the government in giving assistance
is considered to coincide with the purpose for which the recipient is expected to
use the assistance, a plain difference can be seen between individual and institutional beneficiaries. When an individual satisfies his private needs, be they
subsistence, education, or housing, the public purposes underlying the grant used
by him are exhausted. But an institution has needs that can generally be described only in terms of its institutional purpose. If this purpose, private in
origin, is to serve members of the public at large, presumably this service is
the reason for state assistance, and it is pertinent to inquire whether the state
can help accomplish this purpose without altering the private character of the
institution's activity.
Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library'12 remains one of the leading cases on
the problem. The library system in question was established by private donation
in 1882, but by 1944, ninety-nine percent of the system's budget was supplied
by the city, title to the library property was held by the city, employees were
paid by the city payroll officer, and a high degree of budget control was exercised or available to the city government. On these facts the Court of Appeals
required the trustees managing the system to abandon a discriminatory admissions policy for its library training courses.
The case has often been cited but has rarely been held to be controlling in
situations in which governmental assistance was less dominant in relation to the
10. Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 Cornell L.Q. 375, 391 (1958).
11.
12.

Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, 157 F. Supp 101 (D.D.C. 1957).
149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
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total assets and income of private institutions.' 3 Emphasis has sometimes been
placed on the presence of state control of the library system in Kerr as a distinguishing feature justifying a difference in result in situations involving less
complete control. But whatever may be said of these decisions, it is questionable
whether the absence of public control should be decisive.
If the principles of the other state-action cases are controlling, it is not
necessary to a solution of the problem that the "private" agency be declared to
be the state for all purposes. Rather, the problem is one of when and to what
extent the fourteenth amendment will be applied to a private agency. It is
suggested the determination should rest on the relationship between the government and the private agency and on the function performed.
The "predominant character" analysis in the case of affirmative state assistance is not very helpful. One organization may receive no help. Another may
receive a disproportionate share. Every case will differ in degree and in the way
in which function, motive, and assistance relate to each other. But once a
public-serving function conducted by private parties is combined with extensive
state financial assistance, would it be unreasonable to start with the assumption
that the private agency should live up to governmental standards? The choice
of refusing government aid and retaining a purely private status would remain. 14
Although it is analytically possible to recognize an organization's private
status and relegate the complainant to his rights as a citizen and taxpayer to
attack the assistance at its source, the constitutional question facing the court
would not be substantially different. If the court holds that a state can make
financial grants to private agencies that discriminate, on the ground that the
13. Some cases in which Kerr was unsuccessfully relied upon by plaintiffs: Norris
v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948) (Negro sought
admission to the Maryland Institute for the Promotion of the Mechanic Arts because of a
history of general cooperation between the city, state and school, and incidents of affirmative
public financial support); Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, D.C., 157 F. Supp.
101 (D.D.C. 1957) (Negro sought admission to club operated by defendant which had in
the past used three abandoned properties owned by the District of Columbia for meeting
places, and received extensive cooperation from the District police in drives for membership
and donations and in the coordination of club activities. The club did not deny admission
to Negroes, but maintained separate branches for them); Eaton v. Board of Managers of
James Walker Memorial Hosp., 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984
(1959) (Negro doctors sought the right to courtesy staff privileges in the hospital, which
had a history of some governmental assistance). See also note 16 infra. Cf. Guillory v.
Administrators of Tulane University, 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962). Subsequent history
of this case is found at 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
14. In addition to an exception to this general rule reflecting the wisdom of the maxim
de nzininis non curat lex, an exception permitting temporary or "one shot" assistance might
be recognized. Possibly representative of this is the help in building additional classroom
facilities, given by New York to colleges generally, in an effort to meet the demand of
returning veterans. An allocation of $128,000 to Canisius College (Jesuit) was challenged
as an aid to religion, but it was held that plaintiff's status as citizen and taxpayer did not
provide standing to complain. The assistance appears to have been an emergency measure to
help New York Students in the best way possible. Bull v. Stichman, 189 Misc. 597, 72
N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 311, 78 N.Y.S.2d 279 (3d Dep't), aff'd,
298 N.Y. 516, 80 N.E.2d 661 (1948). The case raises the broader question of separating
instances in which it might be said the public purpose is served by aiding a conglomeration
of individual institutions from those in which public purpose demands service to all by each
assisted institution. See note 18 infra and accompanying text.
408
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state helps various private agencies indiscriminately, then this seems the equivalent of a holding that an agency may retain its private character if the assistance
rendered is not so great as to require the conclusion that it has been taken over
by the state. If, on the other hand, it is held that the state cannot make
financial grants to certain private agencies that discriminate, it would seem
reasonable to hold that a private agency accepting the assistance is bound by
the same nondiscriminatory standard as the state.
The problem presented in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.15 is closely
related to the problem raised by discriminatory action by a private agency
receiving state financial aid. Pursuant to New York's redevelopment laws, the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company organized a redevelopment corporation
to participate in a plan to construct housing. At an investment of some $90,000,000, the company constructed a complex of apartments capable of housing
25,000 people. The power of eminent domain was used to acquire the necessary
land and partial tax exemption was granted for the completed project. As a
part of the cooperative effort by the city and the private company, the plans
for the project were subject to the approval of the city, and the company's
profits, dividends, and power to dispose of the property were subjected to regulation by state law. When prospective Negro tenants were rejected by the
company, they sued to enjoin discrimination as a violation of the fourteenth
amendment. The majority of the New York Court of Appeals found no exertion
of state power directly in aid of discrimination and decided that the private
company was not engaged in a governmental function.
The decision, if correct, throws considerable doubt on the analysis suggested
herein. The affirmative acts and assistance of the city and state indicate a'state
purpose to provide specific housing for their citizens, the initiative was largely
the government's, and tax exemption and eminent domain, both means of furthering public purposes, were used to provide extraordinary assistance to the
private companies. The request of the Negroes was related to the very purpose
of the function performed jointly by the government and the companies. In
these circumstances it would not unduly strain the terms of the fourteenth
amendment to open the housing to all on a nondiscriminatory basis. It is true
that a great private investment was involved; but a ruling against discrimination
would leave untouched the power of private groups to provide housing privately
for sale or use by those acceptable to them.
The Dorsey case, of course, involved housing. Were the facts altered so
that instead of an apartment project the end result of private-state cooperation
was a hospital or tourist facility, an even stronger case for constitutional intervention would be presented. 16 It appears that the Burton case casts doubt on
15. 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
16. Perhaps the most pertinent authority directly contrary to this statement is Simkins
v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 211 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 1962). There, Negro doctors
and citizens sought respectively admission to staff privileges and non-discriminatory treatment as patients at two hospitals in Greensboro, North Carolina. Cone Hospital admitted
Negro patients on a limited basis; Wesley Long Hospital denied admission of Negroes
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the soundness of the Dorsey approach in cases involving uses of property commonly thought of as public accommodations. In an important case recently
decided in Tennessee, a federal district court ruled that a motel built as part
6f an urban redevelopment project cannot refuse accommodations on account
of the race of the applicant.' 7 The judge relied heavily on Burton as offsetting
any precedential value Dorsey might have. The result is believed to be a sound
one. Urban redevelopment is conducted initially with state and federal funds
used to purchase .land. The power of eminent domain is used to consolidate
ownership of land owned by many individuals. A plan for redevelopment carefully spells out the uses to which the land will be put, though many of the
uses are conducted by private owners. It could be argued that the public purpose
behind urban renewal is exhausted when the blighted land is consolidated,
cleared and made ready for private redevelopment. But the government is so
inextricably involved in assisting and controlling the ultimate redevelopment
that fairness to all the people who are represented by government requires use
of the property unrestricted by considerations of race. The need to apply constitutional limitations to public accommodations resulting from assisted redevelopment will emerge even more clearly when certain unique characteristics of such
establishments are developed in Part II of this paper.
Other forms of state assistance, where state action is part of the necessary
inquiry, may be distinguishable from specific affirmative grants in that they
are available on a neutral basis and thus are less extraordinary. Tax exemption
for charitable institutions is an example. The theory supporting such exemptions
is that society benefits from the totality of charitable organizations even though
only a few individuals may receive help from a given charity. The important
consideration for the state action problem is whether exemption involves the
government in an endorsement of the specific policies and goals of an exempt
organization. In the case of tax exemption for charitable institutions, applying
to very broadly defined private activities diverse in make-up and purposes alaltogether. Yet the hospitals had received from the federal government alone pursuant to
the Hill-Burton Act construction grants totaling $1,269,950.00 (Cone) and $1,948,800.00
(Wesley Long). The court held that this factor, alone or in combination with others, was
not sufficient to alter the private character of the hospital corporations. The problem of the
effects of federal grants is complicated by the provision in the act requiring administrative
regulations by the Surgeon General which will assure either no discrimination on account
of race, creed or color by the assisted hospital or a state plan which makes "equitable
provision on the basis of need for facilities and services of like quality for each such group."
42 U.S.C. § 291 e(f) (1958). The issue of segregation aside for the moment, can it be
imagined in the absence of a provision assuring participation by all the people in a community that a hospital serving the general public and receiving substantial grants from
government to the end of creating adequate medical facilities for the public could turn away
patients because of their color, claiming "private" right? If not, the death of the "separate
but equal" doctrine in other contexts probably dooms the Hill-Burton scheme. In its recent
report to the President and Congress, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights recommends
legislative and executive action to end discrimination in Hill-Burton assisted hospitals. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 30, 1963, p. 1, col. 1 (west. ed.).
EorroR's Nom: Subsequent to the preparation of this paper, the Simkins case, supra, was
reversed. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
17. Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963). C1
Barnes v. City of Gadsden, 268 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1959).
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most beyond imagination, the theory that the state and federal governments
provide the assistance in an indiscriminate manner will withstand scrutiny. 18
This, of course, is not true where government not only exempts an institution,
but shares responsibility for its creation or continued maintenance by significant
affirmative grants.
B. Non-Judicial Agencies of Government
Government officials involved in the management of government property
or in the implementation of publicly assisted projects need not be so concerned
with the meaning of state action. While both state and federal officials must be
alert to the commands of the Constitution, their decisions can draw their
strength from state and national policies derived only partly from the Constitution. They can ask themselves, what can we do, what should we do, rather
than merely waiting for a court to tell them what they must do.
In determining policies that should be implemented, governmental officials
can begin with certain knowledge that it is not their business or privilege to
require, influence or even encourage "private" racial discrimination. 9 Secondly
they should safely conclude that even if governmental prohibitions of certain
private discriminations are questionable, government ought at least to encourage
the abandonment of private discriminatory practices in places of public accommodation. If they conclude no more than this, there is a great deal non-judicial
officials can do with respect to property owned by government and institutions
aided by government. In the case of a pending lease of property, for example,
representatives of the government-lessor know that one half of the usual conflict between property interests and interests in equal treatment is missing. The
property involved is not private and cannot become so in its use in the context
of potential racial discrimination, unless the lessor's representatives allow it.
By inserting a non-discrimination clause in the lease, government representatives
do not "regulate"- private proprietors, they merely advise prospective lessees
that government property is not available for a use so totally private as to
escape the compulsion of equal service. Such a clause should appear in every
lease of public property which is to be used as a public accommodation, regardless of whether the property is surplus or intended by government to serve the
public. Several values will be served. The government will set an example, for
ordinary private proprietors and indicate to the minority that it is not indifferent
to their needs. The process of gradualism in the improvement of race relations
will be aided. Every new advance in this direction widens the experience of
18.

The difference between tax exemption pursuant to a very general formula and

affirmative assistance to some institution which alone provides some wanted service to the
people of a community seems to be dear. Hospitals serving the public and receiving HillBurton Act funds can be differentiated from tax exempt institutions on this basis. Unfortunately, the difference will not always be this dear-cut. In drawing lines, it seems that
factors such as the amount and degree of private initiative involved and the practical consideration of whether assistance is made available in a manner which truly permits persons
of all races potentially to benefit should be considered.

19. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
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the races in mixing with each other on equal terms. Each new experience enhances the opportunity for additional advances. The burden on the courts to
protect minority interests will be lightened, and in those instances where, according to existing precedent, discrimination must be prohibited, clauses in leases
to that effect can lead to much more effective enforcement than judicial decrees.
All of these considerations should be even more meaningful with respect
to government assistance programs. Undoubtedly one of the very important
factors contributing to the hesitancy of judges in this area is uncertainty about
the reach of a decision. Government assistance is wide-ranging and varied in
its major purposes. The decision of the judge will have implications for a multitude of other situations under the fourteenth amendment. But the decisions of
the administrative agency or executive department to control the recipients of
governmental assistance in their power to discriminate, especially if exercised
prospectively, will have no necessary doctrinal import for similar programs, and
each decision can turn on a careful appraisal of the program involved. The air
would be cleared if Congress would direct a program of project-by-project
appraisal and action.
Important action along the lines suggested above has been taken in recent
years. By regulations issued for the National Park Service, all proprietors and
employees of any facility or accommodation offered to or enjoyed by the general
public within an area administered by the Service are forbidden to discriminate
or refuse service on the basis of race or creed.20 The Army Chief of Engineers
issued instructions in 1958 requiring all licenses granted for concessions (boating, fishing, swimming, etc.) in federal reservoir areas to contain a condition
that the licensee will not discriminate against persons on the basis of race,
religion or national origin. 2 1 The Bureau of Land Management requires forfeiture of lands granted to a patentee for public or recreational purposes if
discrimination occurs in the use of the property. 22 Had the Urban Renewal
Administration required covenants barring racial discrimination in the use of
redeveloped property as a public accommodation, the buyer of the property
would have been forewarned, and the incident leading to Smith v. Holiday Inns
of America, Inc. probably would not have occurred.2 3 At the state level the
Derringtonand Burton cases have led officials in many states and cities to take
the.initiative in policing the use of government property.2 4 The President's
20.

36 C.F.R. § 1.60 (Supp. 1963).

21. Pollitt, The President's Powers in Areas of Race Relations: An Exploration, 39
N.C.L. Rev. 238, 276, 277 (1961).
22. 43 C.F.R. § 254.10 (1963).
23. The Housing and Home Finance Agency does require redevelopers of land to
covenant that they will comply with all state and local laws prohibiting discrimination by
reason of race, religion or national origin. 7 Race Rel. L. Rep. 628 (1962).
24. For example, the Houston, Texas, City Attorney has ruled that lessees of cafeterias
in public buildings may not discriminate in their service. 7 Race Rel. L. Rep. 638 (1962).
The City Manager of Miami, Florida ordered a canteen located in the Municipal Justice
Building to offer service without racial discrimination after receiving complaints of refusals
of service. Id. at 296. The Board of Managers of the Charlotte, North Carolina, Memorial
Hospital ordered the maternal and dental out-patient clinics to provide service to Negroes
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recent executive order concerning discrimination in the sale or rental of publicly
assisted housing25 illustrates action which might be taken even more readily
with respect to institutions serving as public accommodations with the assistance
of government.
PART II
PUBLIC AccoMMODATIONS PRIVATELY OWNED,

AND OPERATED WITHOUT

EXTRAORDINARY STATE SUPPORT
26
A. The Supreme Court

In Part I, the analysis emphasized existing interpretations of the fourteenth amendment and the state's involvement with institutions practicing
discrimination as the sources of rights for the affected minority. A distinction
between private and state action might shield ordinary places of public accommodation privately owned from the force of the fourteenth amendment,
even though state courts lend their assistance to the enforcement of private discriminations, and yet the results urged in Part I would be justified. Now, in
Part II, the emphasis must shift away from state involvement to other relevant
considerations. It still is true that at several points the state will have opportunities to decide whether private discrimination should be permitted. But
it is suggested that the nature of the state's involvement which affords these
opportunities is no longer adequate, standing alone, to command application
of the fourteenth amendment. One might be convinced for reasons divorced
from the state's opportunity to declare a policy that the state ought to outlaw
given types of discrimination or play no part in allowing these types to survive.
But whether the Supreme Court can or should take these factors into account
poses the question of the future meaning to be given the state action concept.
Arguments have been constructed which attempt at the same time to
skirt and rely on the state action concept. It is urged that licensing of a
public accommodation by the state, or a state court's recognition of a private
operator's power to discriminate, links the state to the discrimination exercised
by the private agency, resulting in state responsibility under the amendment.
The illusion that the Supreme Court simply would be applying, more or less
mechanically, well-established precedents dealing with recognized state action
is thus created. What is not accounted for are the exceptions which must exist
to the above arguments. All the results reached by courts acting on private
as well as whites. Significantly, the action was prompted by a reminder from the federal
Public Health Service of certain assurances of non-discrimination which had been given by
the hospital in Hill-Burton funds applications. Id. at 1278. Kentucky's Governor has ordered
that, "Segregation will not be tolerated in Kentucky state facilities, nor shall any facility be
used in furtherance of any discriminatory practices." The order is based on recognition that,
"The operations of state government must serve as a model for business, industry, education
and labor." Governor's Code of Fair Practices, 8 Race Rel. L. Rep. 324 (1963). See also
note 8 supra. These are just a few of the many existing illustrations of the important role
non-judicial agencies can play in advancing equitable race relations.
25. Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962).
26. See generally Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 Supreme Court
Rev. 101.
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disputes are hardly to be equated with state legislation enacting such results,
and the state will not be held reponsible for all the conduct of licensees or any
of the conduct of some licensees. Yet the arguments, creating the illusion of a
mechanistic jurisprudence, fail to disclose, indeed they obscure, the factors
which will or should mediate between condemned and permitted state court
27
action or conduct by a licensed establishment.
This shortcoming of the mechanical state action arguments has led some
writers to urge a more sophisticated approach to the problem which recognizes
state action as omnipresent. Since state or federal law is all pervading in that
potentially all that we do as private individuals is subject to regulation by the
law, the question is not whether state action is present or absent, but simply
whether the choice which government has made by action or inaction in
settling a private dispute is a permissible one under the Constitution. 28 This
analysis might be called a "competing constitutional rights" analysis. As one
writer has said of the case in which a seller discriminates on the basis of race
or religion in the sale of his home:
The issue is not whether there is state action at all. Rather, the
issue is to be resolved by the balancing of the constitutional right
against racial or religious discrimination on the one hand, with the
freedom of the private citizen to engage in his personal discrimination
as he wishes. 29
In a dispute between an employee who claims he was discharged because of
his political views, and his employer, constitutional rights of freedom of speech
and belief would compete against constitutional rights of property and contract. Discrimination in places of public accommodation, according to this
analysis, simply presents an instance of competing constitutional rights, not
distinguishable in its constitutional dimension from a case such as Saia v.
New York, 30 where regulation of the use of loudspeakers was in issue, and the
Court had to balance interests of two private groups to ascertain the validity
of the legislation.
One of the most thorough presentations of a "competing constitutional
rights" analysis is Professor Henkin's. His analysis is directed especially to the
27. The superficiality of an attempt simply to ascribe to the state private discriminations which its courts enforce or recognize has been thoroughly exposed. See, e.g., Antoine,
Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection, and
"Private" Racial Discrimination,59 Mich. L. Rev. 993 (1961); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemcr,
Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473 (1962); Horowitz, The Misleading

Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. Cal. L. Rev. 208 (1957);

Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1083 (1960); Williams, The Twilight
of State Action, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 347 (1963). Compare Pollak, Racial Discrimination and

Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1960). A mechanical use of licensing as a means of satisfying state action is cogently criticized in Karst and

Van Alstyne, Comment: Sit-Ins and State Action-Mr. Justice Douglas, Concurring, 14
Stan. L. Rev. 762 (1962).

28. See generally, GelIhorn, American Rights, Ch. 9 (1960); Henkin, supra note 27;

Horowitz, supra note 27; Williams, supra note 27. Cf. Lewis, supra note 27.
29. Williams, supra note 27, at 372.
30. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
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competition between a claim under due process and a claim under the equal
protection clause; it is not clear whether Professor Henkin would limit the
analysis to cases presenting this claim-primarily racial and religious discrimination cases-or expand it to cover cases presenting, say, a claim of freedom of
speech against a claim of property or contract. Others would apply the analysis
31
without special limitation to racial and religious discrimination.
Professor Henkin's point of departure is Shelley v. Kraemer. Noting that a
state might be held- responsible for discrimination which it encourages or
sanctions, Henkin argues that the state is responsible for discrimination which
its courts render effective. The question is not whether there is state action in
such a case-there obviously is-but whether the choice which the state court
makes between competing private claims is cons titutionally permissible.
Normally, he continues, the equal protection clause prohibits the state from
giving effect to racial or religious discrimination, but in each case, the competing claim, in Shelley the claimed right of Kraemer to choose his neighbors
and to contract for that purpose, must be appraised. If this competing interest "outweighs" the claim of equal protection, the state may, perhaps must,
choose to give it effect; otherwise it must choose in favor of equal protection
by refusing to give effect to private discrimination. Henkin sums up the meaning of Shelley as follows:
If the competing claims of liberty and the possibility that they may
sometimes prevail are recognized,'Shelley v. Kraemer must be given
a more limited reading, and new qualifications must be made to
discussions of state responsibility for discrimination. Shelley, we
would say, holds that generally a state may not enforce discrimination which, it could not itself require or perpetrate. Such enforcement is state action, makes the state responsible for a denial of equal
protection. But there are circumstances where the discriminator can
invoke a protected liberty which is not constitutionally inferior to
the claim of equal protection. There the Constitution requires or
permits the state to favor the right to discriminate over the victim's
claim to equal protection; the state, then, is not in violation of the
fourteenth amendment when it legislates or affords a remedy in support of the discrimination. This may perhaps be viewed as a form
of "reasonable classification," the traditional basis for permissible
discriminations under the equal protection clause. It may, instead,
be viewed as the result of the inevitable need to choose between
competing constitutional rights; when the equal protection clause
and the due process clause conflict, the equal protection clause pre32
vails except in that small area where liberty has its special claim.
The analysis, as Professor Henkin admits, "entails important changes in
31. Given the beginning point, that the state constantly must choose between competing interests, there is no reason to restrict the analysis to problems of equal protection.
The state also chooses in cases in which the interests asserted, if referred to the Constitution,
would be rights of due process. Thus a due process "right" might clash with another due
process "right" or with an equal protection claim.
32. Henkin, supra note 27, at 490.
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the jurisprudence of the fourteenth amendment"8 3 and has "implications for
cases which do not involve racial and religious discrimination. 834 The case of
Gordon v. Gordon,35 where a discriminatory provision in a will was given effect
in Massachusetts over fourteenth amendment objections, provides a convenient
illustration. A legatee who lost part of his bequest because he married outside
the Hebrew faith in contravention of a condition in the will claimed violation
by the state of the equal protection clause. This claim, under the suggested
analysis, "competed" with the rights of testators arbitrarily to dispose of
their property. Since the state in such a case unquestionably is involved in
the administration of estates, we may put the state aside and think in terms
of competing private constitutional rights. Since these "rights" collide, and
since they are, by force of the analysis, "constitutional" rights, one must prevail over the other and the Supreme Court must have the final say, unless it
simply refuses the case by denial of the petition for certiorari. The state has
the first choice in making a rule to govern the conflict, but it is subject to
reversal by the Supreme Court because the choice is between constitutional
rights. And in reviewing the state choice, the Supreme Court cannot inquire
simply whether the state court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in the conventional sense of those tests. The same question may be asked, but the test
of reasonableness will be whether the state chose to uphold the proper constitutional right. It is true that this process is not greatly different in description from that employed by the Court when it balances interests to determine
if a particular state legislative choice is constitutionally permissible. But in
the Gordon v. Gordon context, a legislative choice typically subject to constitutional review would either direct a particular form of discrimination or forbid it. In either event, this kind of affirmative choice by the state would be
tested by weighing its basis in the police power of the state against the effects
of the legislation on individuals. The contest would be between the state and
the individual in the fullest sense. If the state won, the result would be that
it may so regulate individuals, not that it must so regulate them. In Gordon v.
Gordon, the problem essentially was one of non-regulation-the testator was
neither forced by state law to discriminate nor to refrain from discrimination.
The effect of the "competing constitutional rights" analysis, fully accepted, is
not only to force the state to make a regulatory choice, but to transfer to the
Supreme Court as a matter of its routine function the power to decide which
choice must be made. Had Gordon v. Gordon been decided by the Supreme
Court under the Henkin analysis, it seems the result would have to be either
that a testator must be allowed to invoke religious discrimination in the
circumstances or he must not be allowed to. While the Court presently can
permit a state to allow such discrimination through nonregulation, it being
33. Id. at 501, 502.
34. Id. at 503.
35. 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228 (1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1958).
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open to the state to attempt later to regulate against the discrimination, the
Court would face a very different question if the result of permitting nonregulation by the state were tantamount to elevating the individual's power
to discriminate to the status of a constitutional right. The analysis, in its
theory, provides a formula for "instant" total regulation, ameliorated by the
inability of the Court to decide more than a few important questions per annum.
Professor Henkin anticipated this objection by reminding the reader that
the Constitution may "permit" state nonregulation in given instances without
requiring it. But if the ultimate prevalence of one of two competing constitutional rights is not inevitable, the thrust of the analysis is in this direction. 6 If
emphasis is taken away from the use of "competing constitutional rights"
terminology and placed on the idea that a state in leaving a segment of private
conduct unregulated is making a choice between private interests, a choice
which might be regarded as an unreasonable one, the three alternatives open
to the Supreme Court emerge more clearly. The Court might forbid state
effectuation of given private discrimination, it might allow it because the freedom of the individual to discriminate or not to discriminate is itself constitutionally protected, or it might permit it because nonregulation of the private
relationship by the state is not unreasonable, though not constitutionally required. What is inescapable under the analysis, however, is that any of the
three solutions can be adjudged only after a careful application of the Constitution to the specific facts of each case. Where the Court now can find that the
Constitution is not addressed to certain problems created by a state's failure
to regulate, under the proposed formula it could reach the same result only
by finding the failure to regulate a constitutionally proper or permissible solution after carefully weighing all of the interests involved.
It is true, as Professor Henkin maintains, that the Court, following his
analysis, would bring to bear on the cases "a standard depending on degree, like
that of due process." He continues, "That standard in fact is the one which
the Court would apply if the state legislated to regulate these same rights
of liberty or property; it is the standard by which the Court would test legislation to outlaw discrimination in a particular context. ''ST But this comparison
may inadequately reflect the distinctions between conventional constitutional
questions and new ones the Court would face. In equal protection cases, a
limitation of the clause to state imposed discrimination erects as the standard
of equality the legal status of the majority or favored class. Absent a reasonable basis for classification, all persons must be treated equally by the state
and provided with equal legal rights and capacities. If the clause is not limited
to state action or cases of "significant state involvement", affirmative duties to
create greater factual equality for persons in private relationships may be required of the state. What affirmative action would be required would be de36.

See Henkin, supra note 27, at 487, 491, 496, 502, 503.

37. Id. at 502.
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cided by the Supreme Court and Congress.38 Inasmuch as Congress probably
suffers no serious lack of power whatever the fate of the state action concept,
the real problem concerns the role of the Court. The proposed analysis provides
power and a standard like that of due process for the Court in an area where
power otherwise is lacking in direct proportion to the "absoluteness" with
which the Court defines needed state action. In cases in which private interests
which would be referred to the due process clause collide, for example, the
case in which a discharged employee claims he was discharged because of his
political views, the Court again would work with the established language of
constitutional law, but in a new and. harder kind of case. In the conventional
case of constitutional review, the Court evaluates the complaints of individuals against various forms of state regulation. In the new cases which would
come to the Court, evaluation of one individual's interest in having the state
regulate another individual for the protection of the complainant would take
place. For example, after the Court decides an individual has a right to be free
of state censorship, it will have further decisions to make concerning an individual's right to have a forum where his views may be expounded. The Court
decided in Thornhill v. Alabama3" that picketing is a form of expression entitled to a degree of protection from state prohibition by the Constitution. Conflict between private constitutional rights is presented only when the problem
of Thornhill is extended by an employee's complaint that he was discharged
because of his picketing activity. The guidance which the Constitution provides
for a conflict between individual and state is largely missing for the conflict
between individuals.
Nonregulation by the state of private relationships, where the power to
regulate exists, does in a sense represent a choice by the state. And state
responsibility can thus be isolated and made subject to the Constitution as
other state action is. But this cannot be done without a basic shift in the
federal structure as it has been understood in the past. Paradoxically, but
not uniquely, by emphasizing state responsibility in this way, a large portion
of responsibility is transferred to the Supreme Court.
Even within the framework of a due process versus equal protection
competition, to which Henkin's discussion is limited, many difficult cases not
generally thought to involve constitutional questions would become, without
some limiting device, grist for the Court's mill. The case of the discriminatory
will and all of the various contexts in which racial, religious or some other
form of discrimination occurs in private relations bring to mind the many hard
choices the Court would be called upon to make. When the constitutional
arena is enlarged to include all the conceivable conflicts between private
parties (which can be described currently as unregulated) which could present
38. See generally Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L,
Rev. 341 (1949).
39. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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claims of "constitutional rights" deprivation once the fourteenth amendment is
interpreted so as effectually to be addressed to private parties, the enormity of
the task which the Court would have to face or evade becomes apparent. There
is reason to question whether the cause of civil liberties would be advanced or
set back overall if the Court entered the arena as a primary source of law. The
burden of cases raises one question. The effects which an assumption by the
Court of this broadened responsibility might have on state courts, legislatures
and Congress raise another serious question. Conjecture here is not parallel
to the conjecture that the Court's power to invalidate legislation creates an
irresponsible attitude among the legislators. Rather, new arguments against
corrective legislation would be created. If, for example, the Court ruled on the
Gordon problem that state non-regulation is constitutionally permissible, there
would be a tendency by the people to accept nonregulation as the "right"
solution. (The mental processes in which the Justices would engage in deciding
this question according to the proposed formula must be borne in mind.) The
atmospheric conditions created by the original announcement of the "separate
but equal" doctrine are worth considering in this connection. Additionally, the
persons aggrieved by private conduct might tend to shift pressure from the
legislatures to the Court if they felt this easier avenue for relief held promise.
To the extent the Court acted upon the proposed formula, uniformity would
replace the flexibility which the fifty states bring to difficult problems. This
would have some advantages as well as disadvantages. The emphasis of the
formula, and the word "emphasis" is carefully chosen, would be to make of
the Supreme Court an appellate common-law court for the nation. The Justices
would be more nearly big brothers than "elder cousins, once removed." 40 The
very frequency of resort to the Constitution, especially for the solution of
many problems for which the document is not designed, might well undermine
the solid respect which most people still feel for it.
Study of the language of the fourteenth amendment and the debates surrounding its drafting and acceptance I believe indicates a more limited reading. 41 It is unquestionable that the primary aim of the amendment was to
make the Negro a citizen equal before the law with other citizens. But whether
the amendment was to have a larger content, in terms of equalizing the
Negro's status, was not carefully analyzed. The question of the scope or
measure of equality is similar to the question of content for the privileges and
immunities clause of the amendment. That language was borrowed from
Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, but there was evident misunderstanding of the meaning of this section based on the misleading early case of Cor40. See Freund, Individual and Commonwealth in the Thought of Mr. Justice Jackson,
8 Stan. L. Rev. 9, 10 (1955).
41. See generally Bickel, The Original Understanding and the' Segregation Decision,
69 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1955); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill
of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949); Frank & Munro, The
Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 Colum. L. Rev. 131 (1950).
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field v. Coryell.42 In that case, Mr. Justice Washington said that the privileges and immunities of one state's citizen while in another state are those
privileges and immunities which belong of right to citizens of all free governments, a natural law theory which would give the Supreme Court the final
word as to content. From this, many in Congress derived the notion that the
phrase "privileges and immunities" conveyed a content of its own, unaware
that the phrase as used in Article IV should take its measure from the privileges and immunities a state accords its own citizens. The equal protection
clause was the subject of similar confusion. It is apparent from the debates
that the bulk of, if not the total, content of the phrase was to be measured
by the legal status of the favored class within a state. 43 The Negro, or member
of any other race, was to have the same legal rights and capacities a state
provided for the favored race. The Civil Rights Act of 1866,44 which prompted
the drive for a constitutional amendment that would make its provisions more
permanent, provided that citizens of every race and color should have the
same rights in every state to make contracts, sue, buy and sell property, inherit, serve as witnesses and be protected in person and property by the law.
The equal protection clause is admirably designed to secure equal legal rights
and capacities for all persons in a state, but the design is the source of the state
action concept. Legal rights and capacities are defined by the states, and implemented by state administration. While the protection guaranteed is a federal
protection, the scope of protection is measured by the bundle of rights, privileges, and immunities created by a majority within a state for their own
protection and enjoyment. State action as well as state inaction may run afoul
of the clause because discrimination may occur through a state's action taking
away from one race rights provided for other races, or by the failure of state
officers to enforce laws to protect members of one race while enforcing the
same laws for the protection of other races. The standard of equal protection
comes with the theory of interpretation. The limitations of the interpretation
become acute as soon as serious inequalities in fact develop which are based
not on law but on attitudes expressed in private relationships. If no one has
a legal right to enter and be served in a restaurant, equation of rights calls for
the same status-no legal rights-for the Negro. If equal protection means
more, for example, that the state has duties to see that all races enjoy a degree
of equality in their private relationships, the question of degree is immediately
presented. Congress and the Supreme Court would have to define the state
duties; a clear standard is no longer available in the equal protection clause
itself. If the equal protection clause were so interpreted, its application could
go forward broadly and intelligently only by a balancing of interests approach
as suggested by Professor Henkin. A shift of power from the states to the
42. 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). See Fairman, supra note 41, at
9-37.43.
Frank & Munro, supra note
41, at 140-53.
44. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
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federal government would take place,4 5 and this was recognized as one of the
problems of interpretation in the Civil Rights Cases.46 It is less than clear that
the framers intended this consquence.
The privileges and immunities clause, once it was let go from its moorings
in Article IV, had a sufficiently undefined content that it could have provided
the source of power for Congress to combat factual inequality among the
races. But this was not the course of development. The Court in the SlaughterHouse Cases47 limited the privileges and immunities clause as a source of
affirmative rights just as it limited the equal protection clause in the Civil
Rights Cases, and for much the same reason. The privileges and immunities
clause does not embody a clear standard, and to turn definition over to the
Court 6r Congress would tend to shift the power to govern personal relationships from the states to the federal government. 48 At least in part to avoid interpretations which might have this effect, the Court refused to give substantial
content to the privileges and immunities clause and suggested that the standard for the equal protection clause is the status of the favored class of citizens under state law.
But while the privileges and immunities clause has remained dormant,
the equal protection clause has had an increasingly important role in protecting minority groups. And though the standard of equality has generally been
determined by measuring minority status against majority status, the Supreme
Court, as with other standards, has refused to take an absolutist position.
Shelley v. Kraemer,Smith v. Allwright46 and Marsh v. Alabama 6 must be read
as exceptions to an absolute concept of state action. Shelley v. Kraemer must
be read as an exception to an absolute position that the state is forbidden only
to create inequality in terms of legal rights and capacities. The intriguing
aspect of Shelley is that most scholars would probably agree with Professor
45. See Tussman and tenBroek, supranote 38, at 361-65.
46. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). In those cases Mr. Justice Bradley said of congressional action
enforcing the fourteenth amendment: "Of course, legislation may, and should be, provided
in advance to meet ... [violations of the fourteenth amendment]; but it should be adapted
to the mischief and wrong which the amendment was intended to provide against; and
that is, State laws, or State action of some kind, adverse to the rights of the citizen secured
by the amendment. Such legislation cannot properly cover the whole domain of rights
appertaining to life, liberty and property, defining them and providing for their vindication.
That would be to establish a code of municipal law regulative of all private rights between
man and man in society. It would be to make Congress take the place of the State legislatures and to supersede them." Id. at 13. Mr. justice Bradley continued in the vein that
Congress must act against the states, not against private persons. But the quoted language
and other language in the opinion make is difficult to believe he considered this to be the only
weakness of the challenged Civil Rights Act.
47. 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1872).
48. "[The Court] has always hesitated to give any real meaning to the privileges and
immunities clause lest it improvidently give too much." Jackson, J., concurring in Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941). In any event, the framers thought primarily of
Congress as the repository of the enforcement power for the amendment. Fairman, supra
note 41; Frank and Munro, supra note 41, at 165.
49. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
50. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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Henkin's statement, "One feels that Shelley v. Kraemer is 'correct' "Ir though
they might be far apart in their interpretation of its meaning. I believe that
Shelley, Allwright and Marsh all illustrate the judicial method of analogical
reasoning. 52 We know that government cannot zone land so as to separate the
races as a matter of law. How different is a common law doctrine which permits the zoning equivalent through the combined action of parties binding
themselves and their successors to restrictive covenants by simply subscribing
their names to a document? Mr. Justice Black tells us that all the inhabitants
and owners of a territory, combining to form a municipal corporation, cannot
restrict speech without limitations.5" If this is so, why ihould a corporation
formed for commercial purposes, but which owns all of a "town", be permitted
to govern without any reference to the fourteenth amendment? By rtling on
the basis qf these analogies, the Supreme Court has kept alive the spirit of
the fourteenth amendment, and perhaps even more clearly in Allwright, it
breathed life into the fifteenth amendment. Yet, because of the limited applications and the abiding strength of the analogies, it is difficult to maintain that
the Court has usurped for itself or Congress the power to enact a code of
municipal laws, or to govern personal relationships on a broad scale under
the amendments-the power which concerned the majority in the Civil Rights
Cases.
The key to the solution for the public accommodations problem may be
found in this method of analogical reasoning. Under the most absolutely
limited interpretation of the equal protection clause, all that stands between
the Negro and a right to service in places of public accommodation is the
gap created by the lack of a legal right to such service in any person. Absent
remedial legislation, the restaurateur may refuse to serve anyone and for any
reason no matter how arbitrary. But this is the theory. Analysis of the whites'
actual status vis-ii-vis places of public accommodation may contribute to a
solution of the pioblem of inequality.
There is probably no expectation, with or without a legal basis, which is
more firmly established than the expectation of the average person that he
will be served in places of public accommodation. The expectation is cemented
in the private enterprise system which created the accommodations. They
exist to serve; it would be absurd in the extreme to imagine that a place built
and designed to serve the people would be used in a way inconsistent with
the purpose for which it was built and inconsistent with the use which will
allow it to survive and prosper. "The customer is always right" is not entered
on any statute book, but it has an authority no less powerful than the law.
And high or low, rich or poor, beautiful or homely or nondescript, the customer is always the Customer. Mr. Justice M'Lean once spoke of "usages
51. Henkin, supranote 27, at 479.
52. See Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949).
53. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946).
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. . . which have become a kind of common law, and xegulate the rights and
' 54
What usage has a
duties of those who act within their respective limits."

stronger claim to status as a "kind of common law" than one which is so
thoroughly established that formal law likely will never come into being to
replace it? Neither patrons nor proprietors generally think of their relationships as commanded by law, and there is a certain lack of reality in describing
service and accommodation for the majority in terms of legal rights and duties.
But we suggest the lack of reality stems precisely from the fact that the
relationship is built upon a foundation deeper, stronger and more natural than
law. The expectation of service has become a piece of the fabric of society. It
is not possible to separate the expectation of service from the system which has
been privately created to provide it. And so it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which the need to establish legal rights to service for the generality
of customers could arise. The certainty that law would respond to the need
if it arose persists nevertheless. In an age when most of us lack the rudimentary
knowledge necessary to survival if limited to our own resources, we have come
vitally to depend upon the rendition of services and the sale of products by
establishments created for that purpose. More, our system has developed a
broad range of establishments which cater to all without arbitrary classifications, except that of race. Of the realities which govern the lives of most of us,
which is the more meaningful: the absence of a legal right, the existence of a
slogan, "We reserve the right to refuse service to anyone," or the expectation
that service will not be refused? The slogan simply has no relevance for the
well-behaved majority. The assumption of the average white person that he
will be accommodated by places designed to serve that function and which
have accommodated the public as a matter of course is so firm and automatic
that he is hardly conscious of it. Few if any assumptions we make are more
strongly warranted by experience.
Might the Court or Congress act upon this customary treatment of whites
as a standard for equality which is fully as relevant as a legal right, an admittedly valid standard? The gap between this custom and law is so small as
to be barely visible.5 5 And Shelley, Marsh and Allwright bridged gaps. History
54. United States v. Macdaniel, 32 U.S. 1, 14 (1833).
55. just how small can be seen in the concurring and dissenting opinions in Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 726-30 (1961). A Delaware statute provides:
"No keeper of an inn .

..

or restaurant .

.

. shall be obliged, by law, to furnish entertain-

ment or refreshment to persons whose reception or entertainment by him would be offensive
to the major part of his customers, and would injure his business." Del. Code Ann. tit. 24,
§ 1501 (1953). Mr. justice Stewart, concurring in the judgment that the coffee shop in the
parking authority building could not refuse service on the basis of race, believed the
legislation authorized discriminatory classification and was unconstitutional. He did not
elaborate. justices Frankfurter, Harlan and Whittaker agreed that the statute would be
unconstitutional if it meant what Stewart said it did, but they believed the case should
have been remanded for clarification by the Delaware Court. Both Frankfurter and Harlan
expressed doubt whether the statute sanctioned racial classification or was merely declaratory
of the common law that a restaurateur could refuse service to anyone he pleased. 365 U.S.
at 727, 730. These opinions have raised the question whether the Justices would turn a case
on a distinction between legislative and common law rules which have the same content.
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provides some support for the analogy between the expectation of service and
a legal right to service. The common law duty of carriers and innkeepers did
not go unnoticed by the framers and it was believed the equal protection
clause would ensure the extension of the obligation to all. 0 Was this result to
depend upon the accident of a state's adoption or rejection of the common
law obligation? Or was it projected on the basis of the considerations which
had brought the common law rule into existence? It was assumed by more
than a few members of Congress that theatres and places of amusement would
be or could be opened to all as a result either of the equal protection clause
or the privileges and immunities clause. Why would the framers believe this?
Some mentioned the law's regulation of such enterprises,"7 but this is not
enough. Some other standard must delineate between the regulated who must
offer equal treatment and those who need not. Whites did not have a legal
right to demand admittance to the above-mentioned enterprises, but they were
admitted. Perhaps this observed conduct was confused with required conduct,
just as the observed status of the citizens of all free governments-the governments which Washington, J., could observe-was mistaken for inherent rights
to the status. The important point is that the framers, or some of them, believed the amendment would open places of public accommodation, and study
of the debates will reveal a likely basis for this belief to be the observed
expectations of the majority, tantamount in practice to legal rights. The passage by Congress of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which was challenged in the
Civil Rights Cases, is evidence of Congress' belief that the fourteenth amendment could be applied to public accommodations. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in the Civil Rights Cases, and addressing himself to the relationship
of the citizen to places of public amusement, as well as to inns and carriers,
repeatedly speaks of "rights" of accommodation. The purpose of the amendment, he observed, was to secure those rights for the Negro which inhere in
the freeman and citizen. These rights, to him, clearly included the right to
patronize places of public amusement. He seems to have made an equation
between "rights" and usages for purposes of establishing the content of the
58
amendment.
If the Court were governed by this observed customary acceptance of all
This distinction probably is not the key to the opinions. The implication of the Delaware
statute is that a restaurateur must serve unoffensive patrons. If "offensiveness" can be defined
by the restaurateur in terms of a patron's color, one race will be offensive and without rights
to service while the "unoffensive" race, under the statute, will have legal rights to service
so long as they are not offensive on some ground apart from race. Legal rights thus turn
on racial classification and it is believed 'the Justices were concerned with the validity of a
statute having this result. The statutory provision, so interpreted, would be different from
the common law which provides no legal right for anyone, but in practice this difference
likely would have no visible effects. The Delaware statutory rule in its questioned form
reflects actual practices which have evolved into well-established custom more accurately
than does the common law doctrine of a proprietary right to refuse service to anyone.
56. Frank and Munro, supra note 41, at 150-53.
57. Id. at 153.
58. 109 U.S. 3, 48-62 (1883).
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but Negroes, would there be widespread sincere feeling that the Justices were
claiming power to create a code of municipal laws? The standard is quite
as visible as the standard of legal right. The common-sense inclusion of this
standard would do no more violence than the common-sense exclusion of defamation and obscenity from the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments. Use of the standard would be responsive to the problem of discrimination
in places. of public accommodations. Because all whites use such accommodations without arbitrary limitations, discrimination is particularly humiliating
to the Negro. The purpose of the accommodations indicates the felt need of
the favored class for their services, a need which is equally felt by all races.
The broad acceptance of the public in the establishments defined indicates
the interest in freedom of association is slight. The standard will maintain a
balance between the interests in accommodation and the interests in association. The phenomenon of unlimited acceptance of whites in the establishments
and the serious, observable inequality which results from refusal to serve
Negroes surely account for the persistent feeling that the state is abusing a
licensing power when it issues health permits to the establishments, and that
the analogy between public utilities and places of public accommodation is
strong.50 Use of the standard would put court enforcement of particular private discriminatiton in its proper place-outlawed because it leaves fully intact the white expectation while denying it to the Negro.60 The result of the
standard's application would hardly be described as routine, but no basic shift
in the Court's function would occur. The bridge erected by analogy would be
as sturdy as the bridge built of de facto status which crosses an occasional
gap left by an absent de jure status. It would be less fictional than the treatment of a corporation as a citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The
result would naturally create questions about possibilities for further extensions, but its justification would rest on the unique character of the public accommodations defined by the standard. It may be useful in this connection to
explore potential applications of the standard through the use of specific examples.
Custom will identify the establishments against whose discrimination the
Negro is entitled to protection. Included generally would be those establishments which accept whites without question and as to which the white customer
has come to expect service without any question of arbitrary limitations. The
expectations of the white customer, objectively warranted by the established
practices of a given enterprise, would be the primary measure. There is, however, another half to the theory, the analogy between expectations and legal
59. See the opinions of Douglas, J., concurring in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157,
183 (1961) and Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 274 (1963).
60. The state might be required to insure equality of expectation. In any event,- it
could not recognize or enforce rights for proprietors which would undermine that equality.
Hence, self-help on the part of the proprietors could not receive legal sanction. Cf. Schwelb,
The Sit-in Demonstration: Criminal Trespass or Constitutional Right?, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev.

779 (1961).
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rights. The degree of suitability or appropriateness of the analogy will depend
on the strength of the expectations experienced by the majority, and this
strength may, in turn, depend partly upon the kind of service rendered by an
establishment. Some illustrations may be helpful. The typical automotive
service station probably presents one of the strongest cases for an analogy
between expectations of service and legal rights to service. Minimal association between customer and serviceman and among customers is involved when
service is rendered. The service relationship is brief, casual and routine. The
service offered is a necessary one and its existence in the form of retailing
which has developed is strongly relied upon by the public. There is a high
degree of competition among automotive service retailers. It can be confidently
predicted that if service were rendered or refused to the general public on the
basis of arbitrary considerations, governmental remedial action would promptly
follow. If arbitrary refusals of service occurred in a few establishments, those
establishments would very likely operate at a loss unless they were created for
the purpose of servicing only an arbitrarily limited clientele. This method of
organizing to respond to public needs has not developed. Proof of the strength
of the expectations of service lies in the fact that generally no serious problem
of discrimination in the rendering of the service exists.
All but the last of these statements can be used with only slight changes
in degree to describe typical hotels, motels, retail outlets and their lunch
counters, amusement parks, restaurants and theatres. The fact that there are
serious problems of discrimination in these establishments apparently results
from the slight increase in the feeling of association between proprietor and
customer or between customers. But the hard fact is that all of the above
establishments typically do cater to all the public but a few, indicating that
deep associational interests are non-existent. This service to all and the existence of the enterprise combine to prove a felt need by the public for the service.
And the public need is answerd by a few establishments catering to practically
all of the public, rather than by many establishments, each one serving a
selected portion of the public.
Establishments which seem clearly to fall outside the standard are private
clubs, private schools, and Mrs. Murphy's Boardinghouse. Whatever may be
said of these spheres of private activity it is straining to say that public accommodation is involved in the sense that service or exchange of property
occurs without question or previous negotiation. The expectations of the
parties are not of a kind with those experienced by the patrons of the typical
restaurant, hotel or amusement park. While a club of white members will
not reject a white applicant because of race, they may reject him for any
number of arbitrary reasons. Arbitrariness is expected and a value because in
questions of association "reasonable" standards will not adequately categorize
welcome and unwelcome associates. Expected arbitrariness might include arbitrary factors such as race or religion-at least until legislative action forbids
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it in particular circumstances. 6' If a white person believes he can simply
present himself and his rent and expect lodging and board at Mrs. Murphy's,
he simply does not know Mrs. Murphy. His subjective expectations are not
relevant. If he can truly expect accommodation, it is a case of mistaken
identification-he is at Mrs. Smith's public accommodation, not Mrs. Murphy's
boardinghouse.6 2 In short, Mrs. Murphy is a woman who wants to know something about her guests. Generally this will be because she seeks the permanent
rather than the transient resident. Perhaps she cooks for them or allows the
guests to use her kitchen. For whatever reason, she does not rent to all comers
though they are sober and properly dressed. This fact can be discerned from
the nature of her establishment and past practices" with sufficient certainty to
recognize the inapplicability of a theory built on expectations.
Two types of enterprise that might have been classified with hotels and
restaurants but which could arguably be placed on a scale somewhere between
hotels and Mrs. Murphy's boardinghouse are beauty salons, barber shops and
certain resort hotels. The last category is typified by the resort which advertises,
"Serving a Christian Clientele" 63 -meaning generally white Christians. It is
difficult to see how such establishments can be distinguished from ordinary
hotels and motels. They cater to all the public except certain minorities, the
only difference being that a system of service requiring advance reservations
is a general practice, and notice by advertisement of discriminatory policies
permits the members of minority groups to avoid embarrassment. To treat
the lack of minority expectations of service as a relevant factor is tantamount
to a conclusion that private discrimination in places of public accommodation
should be uncontrolled. In addition to the difficulty of theoretical distinction
is the difficulty of a practical, working distinction between resort hotels and
ordinary hotels. This is of particular importance because the nature of the
61. The line which would be drawn by a rule derived from the expectation of service
by the public would be parallel roughly to the line the various state legislatures have
attempted to draw between public accommodations and private clubs in enacting antidiscrimination legislation. See the discussion of such laws in Konvitz & Leskes, A Century of
Civil Rights, ch. 6 (1961). Problems of proof in the application of this lbgislation are discussed in connection with actual cases, id. at 183-90.
62. Mrs. Murphy is an ubiquitous and enterprising widow who operates boarding houses,
taverns, rooming houses and other small enterprises. She was thus characterized by different
witnesses and Senators in the Senate Commerce Committee hearings on Senate Bill 1732,
the report of which became available to me during this writing. The feeling that Mrs.
Murphy, whoever she is, should be exempted from a federal public accommodations law is
shared by many persons, as a perusal of the hearings will show. Size of establishment, widowhood, relationship to interstate commerce and other factors were singled out or seemed to
be by various witnesses as relevant. It is suggested here that the public or non-public nature
of her establishment-does she generally accept all persons without question-should be the
controlling question. A general definition should probably differentiate between transient
guest and permanent guest accommodations qualified further, perhaps, by size or ownership
limitations. See the statement of Dean Erwin N. Griswold making this distinction, but relating it of course to interstate commerce. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Cominerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 27. pt. 2, at 778 (1963).
63. See Trowbridge v. Katzen, 14 A.D.2d 608, 218 N.Y.S.2d 808 (3d Dep't 1961); Campof-the-Pines, Inc. v. New York Times Co., 184 Misc. 389, 53 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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problem requires a solution which will be unambiguous and evenhanded in its
application.
Beauty and barber shops present an especially difficult problem because
they vary in their characteristics. The owner-operated, spare-room beauty
shop strains the expectations half of the formula. If this half is met, the
personal, more intimate service which is offered causes the analogy between
expectations and legal rights to be less clearly appropriate. These observations
are not equally applicable to neighborhood barbershops or to multi-operator,
"downtown" beauty salons and barbershops. But for all of these the theory
"fits" less snugly than it does for hotels and restaurants. The problem is highlighted when we move fuhther along the scale to physicians and attorneys.
Personal, personalized and often continuing service is the product offered. It
is more difficult to make categorical statements about the nature of expectations experienced by the public with respect to the individual attorney or
physician. Society must see that minority groups are not denied the important
services offered, but most of us probably do not think of attorneys and physicians simply as public accommodations, and the idea of white expectations used
as a step in constitutional interpretation is not particularly helpful beyond application to those establishments typically classified as public accommodations. 4
It is believed, however, that doubts experienced as the theory of expectations
approaches the limits of its usefulness do not affect its clear applicability to
these latter establishments, which would include department and retail stores,
hotels, motels, restaurants, theatres, and amusement parks. A court applying
the Constitution might limit the theory to these clearer cases.
B. The Role of the Legislatures
This subject is too broad for greatly detailed treatment. I believe, however, that certain generalizations can be made which will be of value.

There are several reasong why the problem of discrimination in places of
public accommodations should not be left to the Supreme Court. For one thing,
the judicial process is dreadfully slow when compared to legislation unless
the possibilities of obtaining any legislation are very remote. It might take
years for the Court to develop, case by case, the scope of the fourteenth amendment as it bears on this problem of public accommodations. Secondly, the
adequacy of remedies, if an aggrieved person must rely on the federal courts,
64. It is not clear whether some or all barbershops would be covered by S. 1732, 88th
Cong. 1st Sess., § 3a (1963). Section 3(a), 3(i) apparently would include at least those
barbershops in or an integral part of interstate transportation terminals. The sale of goods,
hair tonics and the like, which come from out of state could bring most barbershops under
§ 3(a), 3(ii), but these "goods" are an incidental feature of a barbershop. Services are the
primary, almost sole, product and their effect on commerce probably should govern. If
barbershops are to be excluded to some extent, there is good reason to include within an act
those barbershops directly related to the needs of travelers. A helpful discussion of the considerations bearing on an interpretation of "public accommodations" as used in state legislation appears in Horowitz, The 1959 California Equal Rights in "Business Establishments"
Statute-A Problem in Statutory Application, 33 So. Cal. L. Rev. 260, 272-89 (1960).
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is questionable. Even if the Court were to allow an aggrieved person a cause
of action for damages or an injunction directly against the offending private
owner, or manager, expensive, time-consuming litigation would probably be
necessary to establish firmly whatever substantive doctrine the Court might
develop. The process could, probably would, be tangled by ingenious defenses
claiming reasons other than race for given refusals of service. It is quite possible the problem of enforcement would be even harder, because the Court might
apply the equal protection clause only at the point of some positive state action, for example a state court proceeding, which recognizes or gives effect
to private discrimination. Thus, the Court might not recognize or force the
state courts to recognize a cause of action by the victim of discrimination
directly against the proprietor.6 5 The net result would be that minorities could
seek service with some confidence that the state could not lend any assistance
to private refusals of service, but with no confidence that the positive force
of law would assist them in securing service. Among persons lacking knowledgeable appreciation of the finer points of constitutional law, this would be a
dangerously ambiguous status for the parties.
Legislative action by Congress and the states can draw upon a broader
base of public support than can the Court. Just as important, remedies can
be tailored to meet the enforcement problem. It is generally recognized, I
believe, that the ideal solution to problems of racial discrimination combines
procedures for education and persuasion with procedures for law enforcement.
Legislation can create an administrative body organized to achieve all the
desired functions. In addition, an administrative enforcement agency can
shoulder the burden of enforcement which otherwise would rest on the ag65. In order for this result to follow, the Court would have to distinguish between
state court proceedings which enforce and thus assist private discrimination and those which
merely recognize a private power to discriminate. Such a distinction would suggest that
private discrimination in places of public accommodation is permissible, but that it cannot
seek the assistance of state authority. If the equal protection clause were interpreted to mean
that expectations of service should be equal because they are so nearly equivalent to legal
rights, this would be the status which state law would have to recognize. Put another way,
the state would violate the equal protection clause by recognizing private powers inconsistent
with equal expectations and the state's common law doctrine providing private rights to
refuse service to anyone would have to be modified to the extent it included race as a
permissible reason for refusal. Thus, a state court might have to recognize a cause of action
in favor of the victim of discrimination in order to bring its laws in line with the Constitution. Compare Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931); Barrows
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). See Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System, 474-77 (1953).
The next question would be whether a federal cause of action under the Civil Rights
Act would exist against a private restaurateur. In Burton, the Court applied the equal
protection clause directly against the restaurateur because he was not "purely private."
Suit originated in state court. In Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579 (N.D.
Ga. 1960), and Anderson v. Moses, 185 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), among other cases,
federal jurisdiction was asserted against lessees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1963), and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343 (1963) which refer to acts done "under color of law," etc. Apparently the lessees are
considered arms of the state, see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), but what is
being enforced is the state's duty to control lessees within limits established by the fourteenth
amendment. Ordinary private restaurateurs cannot easily be characterized as agents of the
state. Even if the state is found to have positive duties it will be difficult to hold that
restaurateurs are acting "under color of law."
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grieved party who often will be a person of less than average means and
education. Finally, an administrative agency with powers of investigation
can protect the victim of discrimination from fabricated defenses and the
proprietor from unfair and unfounded charges of discrimination.
All of this assumes the legislatures, state or federal, should act. What
was said with respect to the Court's role is pertinent in discussing this question. The state action concept, of course, has no special relevance for state
legislatures. The concept has much less relevance for the Congress, so far as
power is concerned, than the Court. But in recommending given legislative
action, a balancing of interests-the proprietor's interest weighed against the
minority group's-is clearly called for, and the idea of white expectations
can perform at least the functions of description and reconciliation.
The Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government makes the following specific arguments against the President's pending Civil Rights Bill
as it relates to public accommodations: "It would stretch the Commerce Clause
beyond recognition. It wrongly would invoke the fourteenth amendment. It
would undermine the most precious rights of property. The bill would open
new doors to the forces of government regimentation." 6 Instances of racial
discrimination in places of public accommodation directly involved in and
dependent upon interstate travel seem demonstrably to claim the legitimate
concern of Congress. But apart from this, the analogy between white expectations and legal rights as a step in the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, or simply as a reflection of interests and needs which Congress cannot
ignore, provides answers to the above charges, and in language which should
carry weight with the public. First, it describes the white's status in such a
way as to make him conscious of an extremely valuable "right" which he
enjoys. He might reflect on his plight were the expectations of service and
accommodation withdrawn. Second, he is reminded of the magnitude of the
group of people who share such expectations, a clue to the necessity of the
expected services, not just for the "good life", but for a life of minimum
comfort and convenience. One's imagination is not strained by the suggestion
that the fourteenth amendment, taking especially its origins and the language
of the equal protection clause (and perhaps the privileges and immunities
clause) into account, expresses a national concern for inequalities in the important area of these expectations. Third, the appeal to "precious rights of
property" has a hollow ring to one armed by some forethought about the
nature of his own expectations. One can feel he has a "right" to service only
if he knows proprietors are going to ask no questions. When he realizes that
the proprietor will not question the "rights" of some 180,000,000 of his fellows
to utilize the services, or enjoy the accommodations offered to them, he must
wonder about the precise nature of this property right which makes it too
66. Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government, Civil Rights and Legal Wrongs
1-2 (1963).
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precious for the particular kind of regulation questioned. If it is a question
of association of persons on the property, precious little selectivity has been
exercised by proprietors in the past. If it is a question of a proprietor's pride
in the class of persons he should be forced to serve, again precious little pride
has been demonstrated in the past by proprietors seemingly willing, even
anxious, to serve a multitude of persons of almost every imaginable description. And all of this is the product of a system which made the expectation
of service so broadly reliable. The system of private enterprise has developed
establishments catering to different income levels, but even here, the supply
at a given level is not always adequate. When it is not, it is at least possible
for persons needing services to utilize what is available by adjustments in their
pride or their budgets. Beyond considerations of price and similar factors, the
system does not account for differences in people or tastes. As a practical
matter, putting questions of human dignity aside for the moment, the Negro's
needs are not accounted for by the system. Accommodations catering only to
Negroes can survive economically in only a few places, and then only if they
offer the more commonly needed services. The needs of the individual Negro
can be provided for only if he is allowed to participate in the system which
provides services across the nation for the public generally. The responsibility
to see that services and accommodations are available to all of the public must
be exercised by some agency in order to maintain the integrity and consistency
of the premises supporting the private enterprise system. It is surely as easy
to speak of the responsibilities of the private entrepreneur as it is to speak of
the precious nature of his property rights. It is probable that the adjustments
uniformly required of all proprietors by a federal law will be considerably
easier than many of them contemplate. Because of location or other factors,
some individuals who have invested heavily of their time and energies to
create a small business may be seriously injured in that business. But there is
no feasible way to account for this in a regulatory statute. A serious quirk in
the system of private enterprise exists and it cannot be allowed to feed upon
itself, to serve as its own continuing justification, so to speak; it must be
remedied by uniform regulations. This need for a uniform standard of equal
service addresses itself to the congressional power over commerce as well as
the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment.
The discussion above suggests that in those areas where a theory built on
the expectations of the general public is clearly applicable, the balance between
the proprietor's interests and the Negroes' weighs with equal clarity in favor
of the Negroes. In short, the strength of the white expectations and their appropriateness as one half of an analogy serve as an index for problems of
associational rights, rights of privacy and autonomy.
I do not suggest a legislature, especially a state legislature, should feel
itself bound to the theory as if it expressed a formula. At best, it is a guide
only. In a state with a long history of anti-discrimination legislation, experience
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and careful study of minority needs and majority reactions and attitudes can
provide guidance.67 For Congress, and for states which have not yet produced
anti-discrimination legislation, the problem is different. Not only is past
experience with the effects of such legislation lacking, but in those communities which would feel the force of new legislation, segregation of the races
backed by the pressure of state law or popular custom has generally been the
experience. These attitudes cannot be ignored when considering the role of
the law in regulating racial discrimination. Thus, the stronger the justification
for regulatory laws in terms of their need, justice and the legitimacy of the
legislature's concern for the problem, the greater the hope that such laws
will win acceptance of large segments of the affected public. And the proprietor's
reactions will be keyed directly to the reactions of the public he serves. Hardly
least in importance is the need to persuade reluctant legislators of their duty
to vote for protective legislation. The theory of white expectations can justify
68
and define legislative action.
C. Executive and Administrative Action
An attempt to catalogue action that has been or might justifiably be
taken by the executive and administrative agencies of government is not
possible within the time limitations under which this paper is being prepared.
Each state must be considered separately in terms of its legal structure and
each administrative agency within a state in terms of the scope of its powers.
It may be profitable nonetheless to consider a few recent events as illustrations
of possibilities for effective action.
67. Even though state legislatures are free to strike a balance at a variety of points,
there is a high degree of coincidence between the scope of existing anti-discrimination legislation and the coverage of a theory based on expectations of service. This is understandable
inasmuch as expectations of service are derivatives of the "public-serving" nature of establishments, and this nature in turn draws the first attention of the legislator. Lying beyond
the coverage of expectations but within a legitimate area of state experimentation are those
facilities which are available only to selected persons. These include some private schools, and
most private dubs. Among the public accommodations which may not discriminate in New
York are those primary schools which are not "distinctly private." N.Y. Civil Rights Law
§ 40. If New York should decide that a better solution to the problem would be to forbid
racial discrimination even in distinctly private schools, this would seem to be not unreasonable. Although most would question the wisdom of a law forbidding racial discrimination
in distinctly private clubs, a strong argument can be made that such institutions should be
among the primary targets of those seeking improved race relations. Perhaps the law can
play a valuable role short of compulsion in this realm of private activity beyond public
accommodation.
68. Application of the expectations-legal rights analogy does not necessitate any changes
in the operative provisions of the pending public accommodations law S. 1732, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963) as originally presented. The practical need for reliance upon the commerce
clause is not questioned and thus reference to interstate commerce cannot be deleted. The
distinction in the bill between private and public accommodations probably parallels roughly
the line represented by the idea of expectations. Description of the system which has developed in this country for answering most demands for goods and services by the people and
of the nature of the expectations which the majority enjoy as a matter of custom might
profitably be added to § 2(h) where licensing, state involvement, etc., are "found" as the
bases for congressional invocation of enforcement powers under the fourteenth amendment.
This would provide a foundation for a finding of existing serious inequality and might
prove helpful later to courts charged with the duty of interpreting the act.
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At least three basic contexts for executive or administrative action can be
isolated. One is represented by New York and California where anti-discrimination legislation is broad in its coverage, and the legislative policy against
discrimination unmistakable. 69 In this context, the New York Board of Regents
recently amended its regulations governing members of the licensed professions
subject to its licensing power so as to require service without regard to race,
religion, color or national origin. 70 In view of the broad grant of power to the
Regents to "supervise the practicing of the professions," 7' 1 and the clarity of
a legislative policy against discrimination in most relationships not purely
private, the regulation seems to be one reasonably within the power of the
Regents. 72 Assuming a problem exists in New York serious enough to warrant
some regulation, regulation stemming from this source seems justifiable. An
even clearer instance of warranted administrative action is illustrated by a
recent opinion issued to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia by the
District Corporation Counsel.73 The Commissioners asked for an opinion concerning action open to them to eliminate discriminatory practices of barbers
in the District. In concluding that the Commissioners could issue regulations
providing for suspension or revocation of barbershop license if discrimination
was practiced in the shop, Corporation Counsel noted the following: (1) under
existing law, 74 it is a misdemeanor punishable by fine for the keeper of a
barbershop to refuse service on the basis of race or color; (2) under existing
law relating to licensing powers, the Commissioners are "authorized and empowered to make any regulations that may be necessary in furtherance of the
purpose of this section and to suspend or revoke any license issued hereunder
when, in their judgment, such is deemed desirable in the interest of public
decency, the protection of lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of the citizens
of the District of Columbia, or for any other reason they may deem sufficient." M This is an extremely broad power which might encompass the power
to regulate discriminatory practices without more. But since the particular
discrimination was already outlawed, the problem arising only from a remedy
not suited to the enforcement task, the use of a broad licensing power to
effectuate existing policies seems particularly appropriate and justified.
The second context is represented by the State of Nevada where the
legislature has declared it to be the state's public policy to "foster the right
of all persons . . . reasonably to seek and be granted services in places of
69. See N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40; Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (Supp. 1962).
70. 8 Codes, Rules and Regs. of New York, Part 1, § 23.1 (1963).
71. N.Y. Educ. Law § 211.
72. The factors bearing on the scope of power of the Regents are discussed in Cherryv. Board of Regents of University of State of New York, 289 N.Y. 148, 44 N.E.2d 405
(1942). See also, Strauss v. University of State of New York, 282 App. Div. 593, 125.
N.Y.S.2d 821 (3d Dep't 1953).
73. D.C. Corp. Couns. Op. 3.B6.1, July 18, 1963.
74. D.C. Code Ann. § 47-2907 (1961).
75. D.C. Code Ann. § 47-2345 (1961). This section should be read in conjunctiona
with id § 47-2310.
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public accommodation without discrimination . .

.

.

7

Specific regulations

backed by remedies were not added to the statement of policy. The state's
Attorney General had rendered an opinion earlier that the State Gaming Commission could not regulate discriminatory practices of gambling houses licensed
by the Commission. 77 He withdrew this opinion after the legislature made the
above declaration of policy and concluded that while the legislation did not
regulate rights, nor increase directly the powers of the Commission, the latter
should consider the stated policy in determining the content of such standards
as "general welfare" and acts which reflect discredit on the state, which were
78
to guide the Commission in its regulation of the gaming industry. Gambling
houses perhaps are not the best illustration of public accommodations. But
the opinion of the Nevada Attorney General that a declared public policy concerning the welfare of a state's people should be accounted for by an agency
regulating given accommodations in the interest of public welfare seems sound
and could have implications for many other areas of regulated enterprise.
The third context is represented by Kentucky. There is no clear legislative policy against discrimination in privately owned places of public accom70
modation. Legislation authorizes the creation of a Human Rights Commission,
but there are provisions expressly withholding from the Commission the power
to regulate or to do "any act or thing whatsoever designed to, or resulting in
the forced integration of any privately owned or operated business, facility or
other acti-ity."80 On the other hand, the people of the state seem willing to
move forward in the betterment of race relations and the state has a history
of respect for and obedience to Supreme Court decisions in the area of race
relations. In this context Governor Bert T. Combs has provided concrete
evidence of the contribution a state executive officer can make. On June 26,
1963, Governor Combs issued Executive Order 63-485 which in its most
pertinent parts reads as follows:
Section 1. All departments and agencies in the executive branch
of state government, insofar as their functions relate to supervising
or licensing persons or organizations doing business or practicing a
profession in this state, shall take all lawful action necessary and
appropriate to prevent at all times discrimination because of race,
color, creed or national origin.
Section 2. All such executive departments and agencies shall
take such other appropriate action permitted by law, including revising the rules and regulations, if required, to promote the abandonment of discriminatory practices by all permittees or licensees under
their jurisdiction.
Section 3. Each executive department and agency subject to
this order is directed to submit to me within sixty (60) days from
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 233.010 (1961).
Nev. A.G. Op. 143, March 8, 1960. 6 Race ReL. L. Rep. 1230 (1961).
Nev. A.G. Op. 243, Sept. 1, 1961. 6 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1234 (1961).
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 19.020 (1962).
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 19.050 (1962).
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this date a report outlining all current programs administered by it
which are affected by this order.
Section 4. The chief administrative officer of each executive
department or agency of state government administering programs
affected by this order is directed to proceed with all deliberate
speed toward a program of full compliance with the purposes and
intents of this Executive Order. This responsibility is non-delegable.81
The order has understandably touched off heated debate concerning its
meaning and scope of application. Because most agencies of state government
have been created by legislation passed before problems of racial discrimination had boiled to the surface, grants of power do not specifically account for
the problems and their solutions. And since there is no expressed legislative
policy against discrimination in places of public accommodation, Governor
Combs had to rely on his power as executive officer and on state and federal
constitutional provisions to announce a policy to support his order. And of
course the main federal constitutional provisions are the subject of current
controversy across the nation, so the Governor predicted rather than described
constitutional commands.
All of these factors place serious limitations on the effective implementations of his order. Another important limitation is that the necessary power
to take action tends to reside in the wrong agencies for a solution even approaching the ideal. For example, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board has
broad statutory powers over the liquor industry with power to revoke a license
"for any cause which the Board in the exercise of its sound discretion deems
sufficient." 82 This power coupled with the fact that the number of licenses
issued is limited might well support a no-discrimination regulation. On the
other hand, the Department of Health issues licenses or permits to hotels and
restaurants, but the enabling legislation grants the power simply with respect
to certain minimum conditions of sanitation. 3 The attempt could be made to
use this power to enforce non-discriminatory practices in restaurants and hotels.
It would probably fail, but in any event, should such a course be recommended
to solve a problem of civil liberties? If the net result is to open taverns but
not restaurants, logical priorities are reversed. If there are some dangers of
disorder in opening southern taverns to all, these dangers surely are increased
by an uneven pattern which leaves more important establishments closed. The
trades and professions also are licensed and are more closely supervised and
regulated than restaurants. But again questions of sound administration are
raised by the opening of barbershops in advance of the opening of restaurants.
But if the order has weaknesses and limitations, it has strengths which
81. Governor Matthew Welsh of Indiana, issued a very similar order, Executive Order
4-63, June 10, 1963, two weeks prior to Combs' order. But Indiana had already outlawed
discrimination in places of public accommodation, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. § 40-2308-2309
(Supp. 1963).
82. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 243.490 (1962).
83. Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 219.020-219.080, 211.090, 211.180 (1962).
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more than offset them. For one thing, much can be done and probably will be
done by agencies carrying out the order. The Department of Economic Security,
pursuant to its powers to license homes for the aged and infirm "to provide
for the general welfare of said citizens by promoting safe and ,adequate accommodations," 84 has adopted a regulation requiring an assurance by operators
of such homes that no person will be denied admittance to the facilities because of race, color, creed, or national origin. The Kentucky Real Estate Commission has issued a letter to all licensees warning them against the use of
"block-busting" techniques, and stating that provisions of the law will be
strictly enforced against any false statements and scare tactics used to induce
owners to move because of a change of race, creed or color in a neighborhood.
The Commission might, within its powers, adopt a regulation penalizing a
realtor's failure to transmit an offer to buy to the seller. 85 The State Board of
Business Schools has issued a regulation forbidding all business schools to
deny admission because of race, creed, or color. 80 Other schools, for example,
schools of nursing, barbering and embalming are subject to broad powers of
state licensing agencies and probably can be opened to all. These are only a
few examples of action that has or can be taken.
Other accomplishments of the order are less tangible, but given the context in which the order was made, hardly less important than more tangible
results. The Governor has said to all of the people that the government is
concerned with the Negro's problems. The order has forced all the state
.agencies to inventory their powers, policies and goals, making agency heads
acutely conscious of areas of racial discrimination touching their jurisdiction.
One result, apart from reports of proposed affirmative action, has been reports of conditions in the various facets of regulated life adding up to a fund
,of information. Some agencies which earlier adopted practices to prevent discrimination in public accommodations and employment subject peculiarly to
-their jurisdiction, for example public accommodations leased from and contracts of employment with the Highway Department, have been moved to consider additional procedures which will provide a check on obedience to non.discriminatory policies.
Some of the disadvantages of the order such as its tendency to reverse
priorities might turn out to be positive values. They demonstrate the need for
.a rational, structured, legislative solution to the problem at the same time the
.order in general is helping to produce a more favorable climate for effective
legislation.
84. Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 216.620, 216.640 (1962).
85. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 324.282 authorizes the State Real Estate Commission to promulgate
rules and regulations to effectuate the provisions of chapter 324. This includes § 324.160(K)
authorizing the suspension of a broker's license for "Any other conduct that constitutes
improper, fraudulent or dishonest dealing."
86. Ky. Admin. Regs. Service, Vol. 1, Bus. Schools BS-1 (1963).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION AND DEFENSE OF METHOD

Definition of a role for the law in regulating discriminaiton in places of
public accommodation must consist largely of attempts to justify conclusions
about desirable results and of efforts to explain why any given exercise of
power properly may be urged upon a particular organ of government. This
latter half of role definition could be avoided by attempting to justify a role
merely for state law since the problem of a state's power can be solved by the
same considerations which would prompt one to suggest the exercise of power.
The attempt would be of little practical value, because the problem wanting
solution stems from the unwillingness of some states to take any remedial action.
The most important question, then, is what role should Congress and the Supreme Court play. In suggesting answers to this question, one must not ignore
historical developments, principally, The Civil Rights Cases, and the need to
explain the existence of power as well as to justify end results.
For this reason, the involvement of government by way of ownership or
financial support of facilities assumes great importance. A Negro might suffer
more from given instances of purely private refusals of service than from
refusals by those who are significantly linked to government. But there is a
broader base of agreement that government, as a matter of principle, should
be non-discriminatory in its treatment of citizens than there is respecting action
by individuals, and the governmental link provides a doctrinal basis for application of the fourteenth amendment. Those establishments significantly linked
with government can be treated separately from purely private ones.
In considering the purely private establishments, one could proceed in
a very particularistic fashion, inquiring into the degree of need, etc., of the
victim of discrimination and the importance to a proprietor of the power to
discriminate. Answers could depend upon the type of establishment involvedgambling house, tavern, amusement park, cemetery, restaurant, hotel, hospitaland the availability of other like establishments willing to serve the victim. So
to proceed would reflect failure to understand the nature of the problem. Something deeper is involved than the need or desire of a minority group member to
utilize the services of any particular establishment. And it is wholly unrealistic
and inadequate to attempt to meet a large-schle problem with a small-scale
remedial attack. Even the proprietors in those parts of the country where
problems of discrimination are most serious would probably prefer broad,
unambiguous regulation, clearly applicable to their competitors as well as to
them, if regulation is to be created.
What is needed is a solution at least as broad as the major problem. It
should be reasonably clear in its application so that it can be acted upon with
confidence by all persons concerned. The major problem is serious, visible
inequality, and the most pertinent legal principle with which to combat it is
the principle of equality contained in the fourtenth amendment. An attempt
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to capture in words a standard of equality derived from the relationship of the
majority to places of public accommodation leads naturally to the language of
expectations. Expectations of service, occupying a unique position of strength
and importance in the lives of the public, help to sum up the needs and aspirations of the minorities and to justify and define a role for the various branches
of the federal government.
Beyond the realm of interests for which expectations of service help to
strike a balance, a more particularistic approach is warranted, perhaps inescapable. There is no quality inherent in the problem which prevents the states,
or Congress acting in areas of its special concern, from putting an end to racially discriminatory policies by establishments which never have catered to
the public. For example the states might forbid racial discrimination by
private schools though the schools discriminate arbitrarily in many other respects. There surely is a point beyond which the law will create more harm
than it removes by regulating discrimination. But I know of no means by which
this point can be located other than by specific attempts to solve specific problems by weighing interests and gauging private attitudes. There is one factor
that should receive close attention in these attempts to decide which private
enterprises beyond the typical public accommodations should be forced to
abandon discriminatory practices. This is the factor of extraordinary assistance
lent to the enterprise by government.
Finally, any regulation which does come into being should be structured so
as to represent a sensible solution to the problem and receive the sympathetic
support of the largest number of people, including especially enforcement
officials. The determination to make regulations truly effective is as important
as the substance of the regulations.

